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ABSTRACT
Current comparative analyses of gender attitudes among
adolescents largely focus on individual-level characteristics.
Understudied is the role of women’s protest on adolescents’
gender attitudes. This paper investigates how women’s protests
reported in national news shape young citizens’ gender attitudes
across 32 countries. Using the IEA International Civic and
Citizenship Study survey data (2009), we test whether women’s
protests have a positive impact on egalitarian gender attitudes
among adolescents. Our multi-level models demonstrate that
girls are more egalitarian in their gender attitudes than boys. The
gap between boys and girls changes depending on the level of
gender equality in a country. In countries with lower gender
equality, the gender gap increases slightly as the number of
women’s protests increases, although the difference is not
significant. In countries where gender equality is already high, the
gender gap is significant at all levels of protest but narrows as
protest increases. Our findings expand scholars’ understanding of
how protest influences public opinion among young people and
have important implications for how gender attitude change
occurs and whether women’s protest serves as a tool for
developing gender equality.
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In March 1992, tens of thousands of Greek Cypriot women formed a human chain in the
buffer zone between Turkish and Greek Cyprus to protest the Turkish occupation of
Cyprus. Newspaper accounts emphasized the gendered nature of the protest by high-
lighting that women of all ages participated and by tying the demands to gender
equity through protestor quotes such as “the women of Cyprus are still demanding
basic rights” (Efty 1992). Protests by women have occurred around the world – some-
times campaigning for gender equality and sometimes for other issues. The emphasis
on women as the main actors raises the question of how organizing around gender influ-
ences wider perceptions of gender attitudes. For example, do public protests by mothers,
as occurred against the war in Nicaragua (De Volo 2004) and against nuclear energy in
Japan (Freiner 2013), shape public opinion regarding women’s roles? Not only do these
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women protestors demand policy changes on governments, but through their organized
protest as women, they also present egalitarian visions of women in politics and society.
Gender and social movement scholars have investigated whether women’s movements
with gender equality as a goal shape public opinion, but little work examines the
impact of wider protests organized by women but not necessarily for gender equality,
particularly on youth gender attitudes cross-nationally. This paper utilizes cross-national
surveys to answer the question: how do women’s protests shape adolescents’ gender
attitudes?
Previously, few studies have developed cross-national measures of women’s protest
(with perhaps the exception of Htun and Weldon 2012). Combined with the paucity of
gender role questions in cross-national surveys, analyzing whether protests by women
transform gender attitudes has been difficult (Burns and Gallagher 2010). Conse-
quently, scholars tend to focus on single cases (e.g. Aronson 2008; Branton et al.
2015; Sadiqi and Ennaji 2006; Valentim 2019) or attribute over-time change in
public opinion to societal change (e.g. Inglehart and Norris 2003, 20; Wilcox 1991).
Furthermore, few studies have applied existing measures to attitudinal research on
the adolescents, despite the importance of age in political socialization processes
and despite social movement literature suggesting that movements alter political
attitudes.
Understanding the influence of women’s protest1 on youth support for gender
equality is vital. Adolescence corresponds with the development of independent pol-
itical attitudes and ideologies that are carried into adulthood. The learning of predis-
positions toward specific gender roles is also an important part of the political
socialization of adolescents (Burns and Gallagher 2010; Schnittker, Freese, and
Powell 2003). Adolescents’ experiences during this crucial period can persist well
into middle age or even throughout the life course (Jennings 2002; Jennings and
Niemi 2014). Just as exposure during the 1960s movements had long-term impacts
on young people’s partisanship and voting (Jennings and Markus 1984), women’s
protest may alter their long-term views on gender. Although parental messages
about gender predominantly affect young children, teenagers begin to interpret,
process, negotiate, and respond to additional information they receive, leading to
potential attitude changes (Smetana, Robinson, and Rote 2015). Scholars have
found extensive socialization of cultural and ethnic attitudes among adolescents
(Alexander et al. 2004). For example, girls have a higher propensity to participate in
politics in the future after being exposed to a stronger legislative presence of
women (Wolbrecht and Campbell 2007). Yet, we do not know how women’s protests
– indicating women’s presence in unconventional politics – shapes youth gender
attitudes.
This paper contributes to the understanding of gender attitudes development by
exploring how women’s protest in 32 countries alters young citizens’ gender-egalitarian
attitudes. We argue that since women’s visibility in these protests normalizes their pres-
ence in the public and political sphere and challenges gendered hierarchies within uncon-
ventional politics (Sadiqi and Ennaji 2006; Moghadam and Sadiqi 2006), their impact on
gender attitudes needs to be empirically assessed. If we extend findings by authors who
show that women’s movements transform gender attitudes (Banaszak and Ondercin
2016; Moghadam and Sadiqi 2006; Tripp et al. 2008, 2), we would expect to see the
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public visibility of women’s protest also enhancing egalitarian attitudes among adoles-
cents. Using Murdie and Peksen’s (2015) comparative data on women’s protests in the
Reuter’s news service and the International Educational Achievement’s International
Civic and Citizenship Education Study (ICCS) survey (2009), we test the connection
between women’s protests and youth gender attitudes cross-nationally. Our analysis
suggests that the overall effect of women’s protest is significant, although weak, in
influencing the hearts and minds of young citizens. We also find that the effect
depends on the level of gender equality in the country. In countries where gender equality
is low, boys and girls become more egalitarian in their attitudes as women’s protest
increases and the gender gap in attitudes narrows. In countries where gender equality
is already high, we find that exposure to women’s protests reduces egalitarian gender atti-
tudes slightly and that the gap between boys and girls disappears. The results suggest that
gendered protest affects gender attitudes, particularly for young men who are less sup-
portive of gender equality. However, this effect depends upon the existing level of
gender equality.
Developing support for gender equality in adolescence
Extant scholarship on youth attitudes shows that their daily interactions and surround-
ings shape how they develop beliefs and values (Kallio and Häkli 2011; Jennings and
Niemi 2015). Children acquire information regarding gender roles early on from their
immediate surroundings (Grusec and Hastings 2014; Levinsen and Yndigegn 2015).
For example, children raised in households with working mothers are more likely to
have egalitarian gender attitudes (Gadallah, Roushdy, and Sieverding 2017). Schools –
including educational curriculum, teachers, and peers – also gender teenagers’ environ-
ments, influencing the gender attitudes they internalize (Cribb and Haase 2016; Quinte-
lier 2015). Although these factors help adolescents formulate their gender ideologies,
studies suggest that political context also shapes adolescents’ attitudes (Raviv et al.
2000). For example, seeing women run for political office and serving as elected
officials also helps girls to envision themselves as political leaders (Wolbrecht and Camp-
bell 2007).
Moreover, gender attitudes develop early but are clearly affected by an individual’s
experiences in the workforce, family, and higher education. Focusing on gender atti-
tudes among adolescents allows us to examine the role of protest without the poten-
tially endogenous influences of other crucial life experiences. Attitudes towards
gender inequality are developed earlier than other political attitudes (Martin and
Ruble 2010; Neff, Cooper, and Woodruff 2007), although some identify the crucial
age for political self-consciousness as between 17 and 25 years of age (Jennings
and Niemi 2014). For example, Bartini’s (2006) longitudinal study shows that adoles-
cents’ flexibility in gender attitudes increases around 12–13 years of age. Adolescents
exposed to egalitarian gender ideologies or experiences develop more egalitarian atti-
tudes. An adolescent’s environment also becomes increasingly more important than
parental influence as they age (Davis 2007). Given the importance of adolescents’
environment in their gender attitude development, we turn to the literature on
gender and movements to understand how women’s protest might influence
gender attitudes.
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The impact of women’s protests on youth attitudes
Scholars have demonstrated that social movements influence the attitudes of those adults
that participate (Amenta et al. 2010; McAdam 1990), as well as those that are indirectly
exposed to the movement (Hassim and Gouws 1998; Whittier 1997; Banaszak and
Ondercin 2016). For example, not only did the Israel’s Four Mothers Peace Movement
successfully lead to an end of Israel’s war in Lebanon in the 1990s, but the movement
also shifted public opinion against war (Liberfeld 2009). Large-scale protest and other
“national political conflicts” provide opportunities for youth attitude changes as well
(Youniss et al. 2002, 132). Similarly, where public forums about the environment, like
the recent climate strikes among children and young adults, occur more regularly, indi-
viduals become more environmentally conscious (Wray-Lake, Flanagan, and Osgood
2010). We argue that women’s protest, regardless of issue focus, shapes youth gender atti-
tudes for several reasons.
First, because gendered hierarchies often exist within social movements, protests
where women are the key players raise issues of gender inequality and ultimately chal-
lenge the hierarchies that exist. For example, women’s presence in environmental cam-
paigns, especially in authoritarian regimes (Salime 2012) and traditional societies
(Morgan 2017), opens up the platform for highlighting women’s struggles. In these
cases, the fact that women act as protestors, mobilizers, and leaders raises consciousness
about the salience of gender equality, unfolding opportunities to examine existing gender
inequities. Even anti-feminist women’s protest may have the same effect to the extent that
women activists act as women and acknowledge the salience of gender as an issue,
thereby reinforcing the legitimacy of the gender identity and motivating individuals to
reconceptualize their understanding and expectations of gender (Klatch 2001).
Second, activism and leadership in women’s protests may highlight these women as
role models, leading young people to become more gender egalitarian. Although adoles-
cents are unlikely to personally come in contact with women protesters, these women’s
activities publicized through the media as well as through social networks and social and
political institutions provide a political environment and cues – even on a very general
level – for adolescents to question traditional gender roles. The normalized presence
of women protesting in the streets may stimulate a desire for gender equality and a will-
ingness to adopt egalitarian gender roles. Therefore, we expect:
H1: In countries with more women’s protest events, there will be a corresponding increase
in gender-egalitarian attitudes among boys and girls.
The gendered nature of women’s protest also may affect young men and women differ-
ently. Previous scholarship on the symbolic impact of women’s representation demon-
strates that women’s presence in the political arena leads to an increase in women’s
political engagement and participation more than men’s (e.g. Liu and Banaszak 2017).
Specifically, being in an environment where women’s political presence is the norm
motivates women and girls to believe in themselves, develop political ambition and confi-
dence, and want to participate in politics (Alexander and Coffé 2018). Having visible
women’s protest may similarly empower girls. Just as women’s presence in political
office alters women’s engagement, women’s protests should influence girls’ gender atti-
tudes more strongly than boys because they identify more with the women protestors
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who serve as direct examples of women’s equality in protest politics. Gains in gender
equality also provide more potential benefits to girls, leading to their more gender-ega-
litarian attitudes.
By the age of 14 or 15, girls have developed both an in-group preference for other
women and an understanding of gender bias and discrimination (Brown et al. 2011;
Rudman and Goodwin 2004). Women’s protest expands opportunities to girls by provid-
ing models of women’s political activism and also highlighting – implicitly or explicitly –
gender egalitarianism in unconventional politics. Although girls are not yet influenced by
marriage, work, caring responsibilities, and other challenges exclusive to adults, they may
still consider these expanded future opportunities in a more positive light, given the
overall climate of the country in which they reside.2 This connection to other women
also increases the likelihood of girls empathizing with women’s presence in protests
and having a sense of injustice when gender inequality is highlighted by women’s pro-
tests. Just as the presence of women politicians has been found to be inspiring for
women and girls to participate in politics (Liu and Banaszak 2017), women activists
may also inspire girls to be more supportive of women’s equality. As a result, we
expect girls to be more receptive than boys to the strong presence of women activists
leading us to hypothesize:
H2a: Women’s protest events will increase egalitarian gender attitudes in girls more than
boys.
Alternative reasons may also explain why women’s protests could have a stronger impact
on boys than on girls. Previous scholarship suggests that external cues have the strongest
effect on those holding weak prior views, making them more susceptible to these mess-
ages (Bullock 2011). Studies of adults demonstrate that men’s gender attitudes are more
strongly influenced by the transmission of political messages, perhaps because men are
less influenced by personal experience and personal interest (Morgan and Buice 2013).
For example, when men receive information about women’s leadership, it weakens,
although does not completely eliminate, the gender stereotypes men have about
women in the public sphere (Beaman et al. 2009). Similarly, boys are less likely than
girls to hold firm gender-egalitarian beliefs because gender discrimination and prejudice
do not affect them as much as girls. Hence, we suspect that boys are likely to be more
receptive to external cues than girls because girls are already more inclined to gender
egalitarianism whereas boys are not, leading to our alternative hypothesis:
H2b: Women’s protest events will increase egalitarian gender attitudes in boys more
than girls.
The existing gender context in a country also mediates the impact of women’s leadership.
For example, in contrast to the findings in western democracies (e.g. Wolbrecht and
Campbell 2007), women politicians do not serve as role models in Asia. Instead, the pres-
ence of women in a national parliament has a backlash effect and lowers women’s pol-
itical participation (Liu 2018). Also, having quotas that mandate female representatives
reduces women’s engagement in local politics in Africa (Clayton 2014). Both Asia and
Africa constitute regions in the world where women’s political and social rights are
not aligned, suggesting the importance of taking the context of gender equality into con-
sideration when evaluating role model effects. Liu (2018) and Clayton (2014) conclude
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that the level of gender equality in specific contexts may mediate the impact of women’s
protests.
In particular, in countries with high levels of gender equality, young people may
already be highly egalitarian in their attitudes, meaning there is little room for
women’s protests to increase gender egalitarianism. Seeing women “demanding more,”
especially in countries where many believe that gender equality has been achieved,
could even stimulate backlashes, reducing individual beliefs that gender inequities
need to be improved and support for gender equality. On the other hand, in countries
where gender equality is low, women’s protests serve as a catalyst for dialogues about
and attention to the status of women. Such attention could then stimulate individuals
to learn more about and understand the importance of gender equality. Therefore, we
expect that increasing levels of women’s protest will have a greater effect on adolescents’
gender egalitarianism in countries with lower levels of gender inequality.
H3: Women’s protest events will increase egalitarian gender attitudes more in societies with
low levels of gender equality than in countries with high levels of gender equality.
Data and methods
To examine how women’s protest affects youth gender attitudes, we use the 2009 IEA
ICCS, which surveyed students who were 14–15 years of age,3 about their opinions on
various topics including gender equality. The survey allows us to compare students
across countries with different histories of women’s protests.
We combine the ICCS survey with information about women’s protests gathered by
Murdie and Peksen (2015), as well as other national data from various sources.
Table A1 displays the descriptive statistics for all variables. Our analysis includes 32
countries: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Chile, Colombia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic,
Denmark, the Dominican Republic, England, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Indonesia,
Ireland, Italy, South Korea, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Latvia, Mexico, the Netherlands,
Norway, New Zealand, Poland, Paraguay, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzer-
land, and Thailand.
Dependent variable
Our dependent variable is an index of attitudes toward gender equality, covering many of
the underlying categories suggested by other authors (e.g. Davis and Greenstein 2009).
The questions we examine measure views of women’s rights and roles in the economy,
politics, and the family. Respondents are asked whether they 1 – strongly disagree, 2 –
disagree, 3 – agree, or 4 – strongly agree with the following seven statements: (1) Men
and women should have equal opportunities to take part in government; (2) Men and
women should have the same rights in every way; (3) Women should stay out of politics;
(4) When there are not many jobs available, men should have more right to a job than
women; (5) Men and women should get equal pay when they are doing the same jobs;
(6) Men are better qualified to be political leaders than women; and (7) Women’s first
priority should be raising children. These seven items have a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.8,
indicating good internal consistency.4 Respondents’ answers are reverse coded when
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Figure 1. Gender attitudes by country.
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necessary and then averaged, creating a continuous measure ranging from 1 to 4 where
higher values indicate more egalitarian gender attitudes. Figure 1 presents the box and
whisker plots for each country showing the median (the white line), the interquartile
range (the box), upper and lower adjacent values5 (UAV and LAV) (the whiskers),
and the number of cases outside the UAV and LAV (the dots outside of the whiskers).
Although the overall distribution is skewed toward more gender egalitarianism – as
might be expected in a survey fielded after many years of change in women’s condition
– variation exists both within and between countries. The Dominican Republic, Indone-
sia, Russia, and Thailand have the lowest median values on our gender attitude scale, but
the median value of all countries is above 2.5, indicating that most of the variation occurs
at the upper ranges of the scale. Our analysis focuses on this variation.
Country-level independent variables
Our main independent variable is the average annual number of women’s protest events,
which we operationalize using women’s protest event data collected by Murdie and
Peksen (2015).6 These data, presented in Figure 2, represent all protests led by or actively
involving women reported in Reuters Global News Service every day in a given period in
a particular country,7 which capture protest activities where “woman,” “women,” or
“feminist” are explicitly reported as the actors of the events. Because these protests are
highly visible actions, covered by major news agencies, our measure is a good proxy
for exposure to women’s protests. We use the annual average number of women’s
Figure 2.Women’s protests by country. Note: Women’s protest count in England equaled 10 but was
capped at 3 (the maximum) for this analysis.
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protest events in each country between 2005 and 2008,8 prior to the fielding of the ICCS
survey. England and Italy received the most attention during that period, with an annual
average of 10 and 3 women’s protest events, respectively. Because England’s average far
exceeded other countries’, we cap England’s number of protest events at 3 in our ana-
lyses.9 Nine countries – Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Luxembourg, Slova-
kia, Slovenia, and Switzerland – did not report any women’s protests during this period.
Although the use of Reuters News Service means that some – likely smaller – events may
be ignored, events reported in Reuters News Service are considered most newsworthy by
media within the countries studied, meaning the information is likely to be prevalent in
the country. Our measure is not perfect in its operationalization of actual women’s
protest activity, but it provides some indication of whether the media provided exposure
to the ideas of the women’s protest.
We also control for other national-level variables that might influence gender atti-
tudes. We include a Gender Inequality Index (GII) from the United Nations Human
Development Reports (HDR). GII measures gender inequality in three dimensions:
maternal health, empowerment, and labor market. We choose this indicator because it
focuses on inequality rather than levels of women’s status and because women’s social
(as measured by maternal health), political, and economic equality all are likely to
influence gender attitudes (Inglehart and Norris 2003; Banaszak and Plutzer 1993).
We expect that the effect of women’s protest changes with levels of women’s equality;
therefore, we have an interaction term between the two variables. Lower levels of the
GII measure indicate greater gender equality, whereas higher levels indicate greater
gender inequality.
We use a dummy variable equaling one for post-communist countries because such
countries are unique in their relatively higher gender equality under communism
(Pascall and Lewis 2004). We also account for regime type based on Polity IV Project,
specifically whether the country is a democracy (coded 1), as democracy has been
found to influence both gender equality and women’s empowerment (LaFont 2001; Lind-
berg 2004). We control for a country’s economic growth by incorporating GDP per
capita from the World Bank (2008) in our model because economic modernization
has been found to be conducive to gender equality (Adams and Orloff 2005).10 The cor-
relations of all of the national-level variables are available in Table A2.
Individual-level independent variables
We expect differences between boys and girls and hence we include a dichotomous
measure coded 1 for the girls in the survey.
We also control for indicators that generally predict gender attitudes at the individual
level, including socioeconomic status, family type, and religion. We use parents’ edu-
cation, future educational plans, and exposure to educational resources to measure a stu-
dent’s socioeconomic status. Mother’s education and father’s education are coded as a
seven-category ordinal variable denoting the highest degree of education that the respon-
dents’mother and father have attained, ranging from 1 – did not finish elementary school
to 7 – completed a bachelor’s degree at a college or university, and then averaged over
non-missing values.11 Students’ aspiration for further education is measured by the fol-
lowing question: How many years of further education do you expect to complete after
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this year? Prospective education is measured by a seven-category variable: coded from 1 –
zero years to 7 – more than 10 years. We also include a measure of the educational
resources available in the household, namely the number of books a student has at
home, which is an ordinal measure coded from 1, indicating that there are no books
in the household, to 6, indicating that there are more than 200 books at home. All of
these variables are indicative of the socioeconomic status of the student’s family.12
Additionally, family situations are important for shaping children’s attitudes. We
employ measures of household type to control for the environment in which a respon-
dent grows up. Multiple generations are likely to indicate a more traditional family struc-
ture, which may influence the students’ gender attitudes. Therefore, we control for
respondents living in households with their grandparents. Moreover, households
headed by a single mother are likely to generate very different gender role attitudes.
Hence, we include a dichotomous measure to indicate this family structure: coded one
when it is a single mother household and coded zero when it is not, i.e. when the
father is present, both parents are present, or neither parents is present.
Last, we control for respondents’ religious affiliation and activity because religiosity is
negatively associated with egalitarian gender attitudes (Morgan 1987). Students were
asked only one question about religion: how involved they are in a religious group or
organization.13 Their responses are coded as 1 – No, I have never done this, to 3 –Yes,
I have done this within the last 12 months.
Because of the nested structure of our data – respondents are sampled within countries –
we employ a two-level multi-level model. We model the intercept of the individual-level
model as a function of national-level variables with a random component and treat individ-
ual-level intercepts as random effects. Additionally, we add a cross-level interaction that
examines the effect of women’s protest activity on girls and boys separately.
Table 1. Multi-level model of gender attitudes with women’s protest.
(1) (2) (3)
Variables Women’s protests only Two-way interaction Three-way interaction
Individual level
Girl (=1) 0.35*** (0.003) 0.35*** (0.003) 0.48*** (0.007)
Parents’ education 0.03*** (0.001) 0.03*** (0.001) 0.03*** (0.001)
Respondent’s educational aspiration 0.08*** (0.002) 0.08*** (0.002) 0.08*** (0.002)
# of books in household 0.04*** (0.001) 0.04*** (0.001) 0.04*** (0.001)
Single mom 0.02*** (0.003) 0.02*** (0.003) 0.02*** (0.003)
Living with grandparents −0.03*** (0.004) −0.03*** (0.004) −0.03*** (0.004)
Member of religious group −0.01*** (0.002) −0.01*** (0.002) −0.01*** (0.001)
National level
GDP per capita 0.003** (0.001) 0.003** (0.001) 0.003*** (0.001)
Democracy 0.21** (0.089) 0.22** (0.088) 0.21*** (0.086)
Post-communist regime −0.12** (0.057) −0.12** (0.057) −0.11* (0.056)
GII −0.46** (0.211) −0.46** (0.211) 0.10 (0.263)
Women’s protests −0.01 (0.022) 0.001 (0.011) 0.05 (0.041)
Women’s protests * Girl (= 1) – −0.02*** (0.003) −0.02*** (0.006)
Women’s protests * GII −0.25* (0.151)
Girl (=1) * GII −0.61*** (0.028)
Girl (=1) * Women’s protests * GII 0.07*** (0.021)
Constant 2.34*** (0.131) 2.33*** (0.131) 2.20*** (0.133)
Observations 112,023 112,023 112,023
Number of countries 32 32 32
Standard errors in parentheses; ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.1.
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Results
Table 1 presents three models: one estimating how women’s protest influences students’
gender attitudes, another one that includes an interaction term between women’s protest
and gender of respondents to examine differences in how women’s protests influence
boys and girls, and a third one with a three-way interaction between women’s protest,
gender, and our measure of gender inequality at the national level.
At the individual level, we find strong and significant differences between boys and
girls in their support for egalitarian gender roles. Across all levels of women’s protest
activity, girls are more supportive of gender equality than their male counterparts, as
is indicated by the strength and significance of the dichotomous variable for our
female respondents. Model 1 estimates that holding levels of women’s protest constant,
girls are on average 0.34 of a point more egalitarian than boys on our gender role index.
Thus, we see significant differences between boys and girls even in those nine countries
which have no protest events.
We find no support for H1 that women’s protest activity on its own is positively cor-
related with egalitarian gender roles. As Model 1 in Table 1 shows, the coefficient for
women’s protest events is very small and insignificant, suggesting that gender attitudes
of adolescents as a group are not associated with women’s protest activity across all
countries. This is true even when all other national-level gender characteristics are
dropped from the model. Thus, there is no support for the hypothesis that exposure
to women’s protests enhances all adolescents’ egalitarian gender attitudes in the same
way across all countries.
Figure 3. Predicted gender attitudes for girls and boys over range of protest activity.
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We have competing hypotheses about the interaction between an individual’s gender
and women’s protest. Model 2 in Table 1 allows us to examine these competing hypoth-
eses: H2a and H2b. We find that the interaction is significant but negative. We illustrate
the predicted gender egalitarianism for girls and boys from this model over women’s
protest in Figure 3. This figure demonstrates girls’ gender egalitarianism exceeds that
of boys at all levels of women’s protest activity. Women’s protest increases boys’
gender egalitarianism very slightly, but there is a reduction in girls’ gender-egalitarian
attitudes at the same time, reducing the gap between the sexes. Nevertheless, when we
calculate the average marginal effect of protest on gender attitudes for boys and girls,
we find that these positive and negative slopes are not statistically significant. The
average change in girls’ and boys’ gender attitudes is −0.02 (p = .33) and 0.006 (p
= .98), respectively.
These findings suggest that across all countries, women’s protest is associated with a
reduced gap between boys’ and girls’ levels of gender egalitarianism, but the effect is not
very large, at least over the size of women’s protests in this time period. While our
findings contradict our initial hypotheses, we know that girls already have very high
support for gender egalitarianism and that the average level of gender inequality is low
in most of the countries studied. Potentially, we may be seeing an effect dominated by
countries where gender equality has already been achieved. In these countries, girls
think that they live in a post-feminist world and react negatively to women’s protest.
To investigate whether gender equality in a country influences the effect of women’s
protest on boys’ and girls’ attitudes toward gender egalitarianism (H3), we turn to Model
3 in Table 1. This model shows results from our three-way interaction integrating the
potential impact that national level of gender inequality has on how women’s protest
relates to girls’ and boys’ gender egalitarianism attitudes.14 To better understand the
three-way interaction model, Figure 4 shows the predicted level of gender egalitarianism
for girls and boys over the range of women’s protest events at three levels of gender
inequality at the national level. In countries with the lowest levels of gender inequality,
we find both boys’ and girls’ level of gender egalitarianism increases as the average
number of women’s protest events increases. However, in countries with the highest
level of gender inequality, increases in women’s protest are correlated with lower
levels of gender-egalitarian attitudes. For instance, in countries, the lowest level of
gender inequality (e.g. Denmark, Sweden), boys’ predicted level of gender egalitarianism
increases from 3.02 without any women’s protest to 3.13 at the highest level of women’s
protest. Similarly, girls’ level of gender egalitarianism increases from 3.49 to 3.55. In
countries with the highest level of gender inequality (e.g., Indonesia, Paraguay), boys’
predicted level of gender egalitarianism decreases from 3.07 when there is no women’s
protest to 2.81 at the highest level of women’s protest. Similarly, girls’ level of gender ega-
litarianism decreases from 3.24 to 3.03. Thus, the effect of women’s protest on gender
attitudes varies considerably by national gender inequality, and runs counter to our
initial hypothesis.
Figure 5 shows how the three-way interaction influences the gap between boys and
girls gender egalitarianism by illustrating the marginal effect of girls compared to boys
over women’s protest for three levels of national gender inequality. The difference
between girls’ and boys’ gender egalitarianism decreases with increasing protest in
countries with lower levels of gender inequality, while it increases in countries with
12 L. A. BANASZAK ET AL.
Figure 4. Predicted gender attitudes for girls and boys over protest activity at different levels of
national gender inequality (GII=0.05, 0.30, and 0.55).
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Figure 5. Marginal effects showing difference between girls and boys over women’s protest for
different levels of national gender inequality (GII=0.05, 0.30, and 0.55).
14 L. A. BANASZAK ET AL.
higher levels of gender inequality. In countries where there are already high levels of
gender equality like Sweden (GII = 0.5), increasing women’s protest reduces the gap in
girls’ and boys’ gender egalitarianism from 0.45 to 0.40. In countries with high gender
inequality like Indonesia (GII = 0.54), the gap between boys’ and girls’ attitudes actually
increases as women’s protest increases from 0.15 to 0.21. Taken together, these results
suggest that there are significantly different processes occurring in nations with high
inequality and those where there is more gender equality.15
Conclusion
Although most prior literature on social movement outcomes has focused on policymak-
ing, social movement activists often argue that they care as much about changing the
hearts and minds of the public as they do about policy change. Yet, previous studies
on how social movement activism affects attitudes focus largely on attitudinal change
among adults and is rarely cross-national in scope. We conduct a cross-national analysis
of students aged 14–15 to evaluate how exposure to women’s protest in their younger
years influences gender attitudes. We show that the average number of women’s
protest influences boys’ and girls’ gender egalitarianism, but that the effect is conditional
on the status of women in the country. In countries where gender equality is already high,
more women’s protest increases adolescents’ gender-egalitarian values and the gap
between girls and boys narrows as the number of protests increases. However, the
effects are relatively small in both cases. In cases where gender inequality is high, less
of a gap exists between boys and girls, but the gap widens as more women’s protest
occurs. Moreover, women’s protest reduces slightly the gender egalitarianism of both
boys and girls (although less so for girls).
Our tests here are conservative and we argue that the size of these effects, while small,
is likely underestimated. Certainly, given all of the influences on adolescent socialization,
protest and the underlying movements that are signaled by that protest may be of lesser
influence. However, there are several reasons to believe the effects in this analysis are
underestimated.
First, because women’s protest activity is episodic, there are likely to be periods when
the number of protests far exceed those found in our data; it is possible that stronger
positive effects are likely increased more during such episodes. In particular, 2005–
2008 was not a period of highly visible women’s protest in many of our countries. It
may take intense exposure to women’s protest activity or repeated exposure over more
years before this accumulates into changed gender attitudes. Secondly, in countries
with higher gender equality, which constitute the bulk of our sample, after decades of
women’s protest in many countries, much of the generational change resulting from
women’s protest events may already have occurred. As we indicated, the skewness of
gender role attitudes toward egalitarianism provides little room for change, especially
among girls. A more nuanced measures of gender egalitarianism or a wider range of
developing and developed countries might provide for a larger effect. Finally, and
most importantly, we have no direct evidence of exposure of the students to the
protest, but assume it based on media reports. Additional research that examines
direct exposure or focuses on local communities directly exposed to protest might find
stronger effects. Given all of these caveats, we believe the effect of women’s protest on
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gender attitudes warrants further study. In that sense, this study can also serve as an
initial step to extended analysis of how protest – and social movements more generally
influence attitudes.
We also note the importance of the gender context of each country in determining the
effects of women’s protest on gender attitudes. Perhaps our most puzzling result is that
gender egalitarianism among boys and girls decreases as the number of women’s protests
increases in gender-unequal countries. Several possible explanations exist for the differ-
ential effects among countries with varying levels of gender equality. First, the nature of
the protest may differ in countries with high and low gender equality. In particular,
women who protest in countries with high levels of gender inequality may frame their
protests along more traditional values in order to reach a wider array of the population.
For example, their protests may emphasize traditional gender roles like motherhood. If
women’s protest embraces traditional values, perhaps it channels adolescents’ gender
attitudes toward more traditional views, affecting girls less than boys because girls’ per-
sonal experiences and interests give them a greater stake in gender egalitarianism. Alter-
natively, women’s protest may provide similar messages regardless of a country’s level of
gender inequality but the media reports on protest may differ or the adolescents’ social
networks may filter information about protest in ways that change the message. For
example, the media could emphasize women protestors’ traditional family roles or
perhaps teachers, parents, or friends denigrate women’s protest to adolescents more in
gender-unequal countries. Given that countermovement events go hand in hand with
movement events in the US (Banaszak and Ondercin 2016a), these adolescents may
also be seeing more traditional gender values in gender-unequal countries as women’s
protest increases.
In any case, our results demonstrate that the economic development and moderniz-
ation explanations suggested by Inglehart and Norris (2003) are not the only driving
forces behind people’s gender attitudes. Controlling for both economic development
and the level of gender inequality, we found an influence of women’s protest on
gender attitudes. Since many developed countries also have extensive women’s protests,
the cumulative effect of the publicity that comes with the emergence and strengthening of
women’s movements may have contributed to changing gender role attitudes, although
these have not been given credit for such an effect thus far. In a sense, women’s protests
may be an unmeasured confounding variable in most cross-national analyses of gender
attitudes.
More importantly, the focus on adolescents helps us deal with some of the problems
with endogeneity that influence many studies of adults. In contrast to adults who are also
socialized by their experiences in the workplace and family and even may have partici-
pated in the women’s protests themselves, our respondents are at the stage where they
are formulating their own gender roles and political opinions. These students are not
likely to have played any meaningful role in these events. Because the women’s protest
events included here occurred one to four years before these 14- and 15-year-old students
were asked about their attitudes, it is highly unlikely that we face issues of reverse caus-
ality. Although the attitudes developed in childhood do not completely determine adult
gender attitudes, our research goes a long way toward suggesting that the experiences of
those coming to adulthood during extensive women’s protest may explain increase in the
egalitarian gender attitudes we see in many countries. Under this view, those in their
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impressionable years incorporate new cultural norms into their worldview (see, for
example, Hart-Brinson 2018).
This article is a first step to examining how exposure to social movements might
influence youth attitudes. Our measure of women’s protest – taken from media
reports – is also a first attempt to capture citizens’ exposure to women’s protest cross-
nationally. The study suggests that being in an environment where women’s protest is
normalized may have contributed to the changes in gender attitudes that we have seen
over the last 50 years, although sometimes in surprising ways. Moreover, our results
demonstrate a need to further contextualize how women’s protests shape youth attitudes.
Particularly, in countries like Indonesia, where the population is spread across local con-
texts and media may be highly differentiated in each area, it will be important to explore
within-country variation, in addition to cross-country. All of this suggests that finer
measures and additional studies are needed to understand how women’s protest influ-
ences gender attitudes.
Notes
1. We define women’s protests as protests with women or feminists as key actors. The protest
goals can be advancing gender equality, but may also focus on issues unrelated to gender
equality.
2. Although boys may also benefit from gender egalitarianism – for example, through
expanded future opportunities for spouses or by having a wider array of career options
or gender roles – their perceptions of the marginal benefit coming from gender egalitarian-
ism is unlikely to be as strong as for girls.
3. Studies that show children are politically socialized date back to the 1960s (e.g. Greenstein
1965; Hess and Easton 1960). More recently, Oxley et al.’s (2020) experimental survey of 500
elementary school children in the US finds political orientations begin to form from child-
hood. Therefore, we see merit in studying the attitudes of adolescents aged 14–15.
4. This reliability varies by country. In 24 countries, the reliability was over 0.7. Two countries
had Cronbach’s alpha below 0.6: Mexico (alpha=0.59) and the Dominican Republic
(alpha=0.53). The strength of the measure cross-nationally and within most countries as
well as the fact that no other subset of measures produces stronger reliability gives us confi-
dence in the measure.
5. The UAV and LAV represent 1.5 times the interquartile range both above and below the first
and third quartiles.
6. We use the Murdie and Peksen data over Htun and Weldon’s (2012) coding of women’s
movement strength for several reasons. First, the Murdie and Pekson data provide more
coverage of the countries within the ICCS data set than the Htun and Weldon data,
which is needed to provide statistical power to our multi-level analysis. Second, our
paper relies heavily on the transmission of information about women’s protest to the
general public; Murdie and Peksen’s data, although no doubt biased toward major events,
more accurately represents this process. Htun and Weldon’s strength of the women’s move-
ment measure – collected every decade – focuses more on legitimacy and political influence
(Weldon, private communication) – although undoubtedly also includes some aspects of
visibility. Because Htun andWeldon’s data were measured in 2005 and represent movement
strength over the previous decade, they also lie further back in time, which is problematic
given the young age of our respondents. The correlation between the two measures is
modest (r=0.36), but our robustness check shows the coefficients remain in the expected
direction, although several lose statistical significance with fewer countries in the analysis.
7. We acknowledge that the use of Reuters, like other news sources, introduces bias to our
measure of women’s protests (e.g. Andrews and Caren 2010) likely based on size and
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proximity to reporters among other factors. We argue that this bias is less problematic in
discussing how movement events influence public opinion, since most adolescents experi-
ence women’s protests through reported events or indirectly through the discussion of those
reported events in schools, their families, and their social networks. Although concerns
about the bias of events are important when examining what explains events, using a
measure that does not separate out the reporting from the actual activity reflects the
causal mechanism in this case.
8. These are the preadolescent years when our respondents begin to enter adolescence – a stage
when preadolescents start to form opinions about politics, religion, sexuality, and gender
roles according to psychologists (Egan and Perry 2001; Halim and Ruble 2010).
9. Alternative specifications including models where England is coded at 10, the number of
protests is summed rather than averaged, a log of protest events is used, and a dichotomous
measure for women’s protests are reported in Table A5. All find similar effects of women’s
protest and its interaction with gender.
10. For a robustness check, we control for a country’s religious context using the percentage of
Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox adherents in the respondent’s country taken from
the World Religion Dataset (2005). Because most countries in our data set are European
and Latin American, several countries have a population of more than 40% of either
Roman Catholic or Eastern Orthodox adherents, majority of Islamic adherents. Results
using the measure of very traditional Christian religions are shown in Model 1 of Table A3.
11. Ideally, we would use mother’s education as a baseline model to analyze how adolescents’
gender role attitudes are affected by their mother’s educational level. However, including
mother’s and father’s education separately excludes respondents whose mother’s or
father’s education information is missing. Thus, we take an average of parents’ education
instead to ensure that respondents who come from family different structures are included
in the sample. Our robustness check displayed in Table A4 indicates separating mother’s
education and father’s education yields similar results to averaging parents’ educational
backgrounds as in the main model. Moreover, the more educated mothers and fathers
are, the more egalitarian are respondents’ gender attitudes, although the effect of
mothers’ education is slightly stronger than fathers’.
12. Our level 1 model includes most of the standard measures of the individual-level studies. We
do not have mother’s employment status or parental gender attitudes because the ICCS asks
the respondents few questions about students’ parents. In multi-level models, an aggregate-
level variable may affect another aggregate-level variable and an individual-level variable
may affect other individual-level variables. However, the omission of individual-level vari-
ables does not bias the coefficient estimates of aggregate-level variables (Krull and MacKin-
non 2001). Thus, the exclusion of the mother’s employment status should not affect our
conclusions about women’s protest.
13. The ICCS does not ask students whether the organization is in or outside of school, but the
nature of the question ordering implies that it could be either.
14. For three-way interactions, scholars need to include all the component variables including
interactions (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006). Therefore, in addition to gender, women’s
protest, women’s protest interacted with respondent gender, and gender inequality in Model
2, we include in Model 3 gender inequality interacted with women’s protest, respondent
gender interacted with national gender inequality, and the three-way interaction of respon-
dent gender, women’s protest and women’s inequality.
15. See the Appendix for further analysis of the correlations between our control variables and
gender role attitudes.
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Appendix
Table A1. Summary descriptive statistics of variables.
Variables Mean Std Min Max
Female 0.51 0.50 0 1
Mom’s education 4.22 1.32 1 6
Dad’s education 4.23 1.30 1 6
Parents’ averaged education 4.22 1.20 1 6
Student’s future education plan 4.16 1.01 1 5
Number of books in household 3.22 1.37 1 6
Single mom 0.23 0.42 0 1
Living with grandparents 0.21 0.41 0 1
Member of religious group 1.56 0.80 1 3
GDP per capita (thousands) 30.68 28.11 2.16 114.29
Democracy 0.92 0.27 0 1
Post-communist regime 0.23 0.42 0 1
National religion (% Catholics and Orthodox Christian) 0.52 0.36 0.002 0.95
% women in non-agricultural employment 45.40 4.95 32.4 52.1
Women’s political rights 2.26 0.48 1 3
% women in parliament 21.10 9.75 8.4 47
Women’s protest events 0.97 1.68 0 10.75
Women’s protest events (capped at 3) 0.81 0.94 0 3
Gender attitudes index 3.20 0.57 1 4
Table A2. Correlation coefficients for the national-level variables.
GDP per capita 1.00
Post-communist regime −0.26 1.00
Democracy 0.25 −0.15 1.00
National religion (% Catholics and Orthodox
Christian)
−0.10 0.13 0.17 1.00
% women in non-agricultural employment 0.28 0.44 −0.14 −0.09 1.00
Women’s political rights 0.39 −0.30 0.16 −0.26 0.09 1.00
% Women in parliament 0.59 −0.21 0.26 −0.33 0.34 0.72 1.00
GII −0.67 −0.10 −0.22 0.24 −0.58 −0.38 −0.59 1.00
Women’s protest events −0.15 −0.24 −0.12 −0.04 −0.40 −0.24 −0.08 0.23 1.00
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Table A3. Multi-level model of gender attitudes with women’s protests, including national religion,
women’s political rights, and democracy and excluding non-democracy.
(1) (2) (3)
Variables National religion Women’s political rights Excluding non-democracy
Individual-level
Girl (=1) 0.48*** (0.007) 0.48*** (0.007) 0.48*** (0.007)
Parents’ education 0.03*** (0.001) 0.03*** (0.001) 0.03*** (0.001)
Respondent’s educational aspiration 0.08*** (0.002) 0.08*** (0.002) 0.08*** (0.002)
# of books in household 0.04*** (0.001) 0.04*** (0.001) 0.04*** (0.001)
Single mom 0.02*** (0.003) 0.02*** (0.003) 0.02*** (0.003)
Living with grandparents −0.03*** (0.004) −0.03*** (0.004) −0.03*** (0.004)
Member of religious group −0.01*** (0.001) −0.01*** (0.001) −0.01*** (0.001)
National level
GDP per capita 0.003*** (0.001) 0.003*** (0.001) 0.003** (0.001)
Democracy 0.23*** (0.087) 0.22*** (0.084) –
Post-communist regime −0.10* (0.057) −0.08 (0.059) −0.11* (0.064)
% Catholics and Orthodox Christian −0.06 (0.062) – –
Women’s political rights – 0.062 (0.046) –
GII 0.18 (0.279) 0.20 (0.267) 0.08 (0.272)
Women’s protests events 0.06 (0.041) 0.06 (0.041) 0.05 (0.042)
Women’s protests events * girl −0.02*** (0.006) −0.02*** (0.006) −0.02*** (0.006)
Women’s protests * GII −0.29* (0.156) −0.27* (0.148) −0.25 (0.158)
Girl (=1) * GII −0.61*** (0.028) −0.61*** (0.028) −0.59*** (0.029)
Girl (=1) * Women’s protests * GII 0.07*** (0.021) 0.07*** (0.021) 0.07*** (0.021)
Constant 2.19*** (0.132) 2.02*** (0.188) 2.41*** (0.106)
Observations 112,023 112,023 102,810
Number of countries 32 32 30
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1
Table A4. Multi-level model of gender attitudes with women’s protests, with separated mother’s and
father’s education
(1) (2)
Variables Women’s movement Interaction
Individual level
Girl (=1) 0.34*** (0.003) 0.36*** (0.004)
Mom’s education 0.02*** (0.002) 0.02*** (0.002)
Dad’s education 0.01*** (0.002) 0.01*** (0.002)
Respondent’s educational aspiration 0.08*** (0.002) 0.08*** (0.002)
# of books in household 0.04*** (0.001) 0.04*** (0.001)
Single mom 0.02*** (0.004) 0.02*** (0.004)
Living with grandparents −0.03*** (0.004) −0.03*** (0.004)
Member of religious group −0.01*** (0.002) −0.01*** (0.002)
National level
GDP per capita 0.003*** (0.001) 0.003*** (0.001)
Democracy 0.22** (0.089) 0.28** (0.097)
Post-communist regime −0.12* (0.057) −0.13* (0.067)
GII −0.46** (0.211) 0.10 (0.263)
Women’s protests −0.01 (0.02) 0.05 (0.041)
Women’s protests * Girl (= 1) −0.023*** (0.006)
Women’s protests * GII −0.26* (0.152)
Girl (=1) * GII −0.622*** (0.029)
Girl (=1) * Women’s protests * GII 0.081*** (0.021)
Constant 2.34*** (0.131) 2.20*** (0.134)
Observations 107,228 107,228
Number of countries 32 32
Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10.
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Table A5. Multi-level model of gender attitudes with different women’s protest measures.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables









Girl (=1) 0.48*** (0.007) 0.48*** (0.007) 0.48*** (0.007) 0.48*** (0.007)




0.08*** (0.002) 0.08*** (0.002) 0.08*** (0.002) 0.08*** (0.002)
# of books in
household
0.04*** (0.001) 0.04*** (0.001) 0.04*** (0.001) 0.04*** (0.001)
Single mom 0.02*** (0.003) 0.02*** (0.003) 0.02*** (0.003) 0.02*** (0.003)
Living with
grandparents
−0.03*** (0.004) −0.03*** (0.004) −0.03*** (0.004) −0.03*** (0.004)
Member of religious
group
−0.01*** (0.001) −0.01*** (0.001) −0.01*** (0.001) −0.01*** (0.001)
National level
GDP per capita 0.003*** (0.001) 0.003*** (0.001) 0.003*** (0.001) 0.003*** (0.001)
Democracy 0.22** (0.085) 0.29** (0.113) 0.34*** (0.106) 0.28*** (0.094)
Post-communist
regime
−0.10* (0.054) −0.12* (0.069) −0.09 (0.071) −0.11 (0.071)
GII 0.10 (0.262) −0.16 (0.259) −0.96 (0.796) 0.06 (0.237)
Women’s protests 5.84* (3.308) 0.14 (0.282) 0.021 (0.042) 0.15 (0.096)
Women’s protests *
Girl (= 1)
−1.55*** (0.472) −0.001 (0.0003) −0.002 (0.006) −0.07*** (0.024)
Women’s protests *
GII
−26.06* (14.95) −0.003 (0.12) −0.17 (0.154) −0.63** (0.318)
Girl (=1) * GII −0.61*** (0.028) −0.55*** (0.028) −0.30*** (0.108) −0.59*** (0.024)
Girl (=1) * Women’s
protests * GII
6.75*** (2.012) 0.001 (0.001) 0.04* (0.021) 0.19*** (0.043)
Constant 2.19*** (0.128) 2.23*** (0.129) 2.33*** (0.244) 2.20*** (0.123)
Observations 112,023 112,023 85,120 112,023
Number of countries 32 32 23 32
Standard errors in parentheses.
***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.1.
Correlations between control variables and gender attitudes
The individual-level and national-level control variables show strong consistency in all three
models. The individual-level control variables are all significant and signed in the expected direc-
tion. The three measures of socioeconomic status – parents’ education, students’ educational
aspirations, and the number of books students have at home—are positively related to the
gender egalitarianism index at the 0.05 statistical significance level. Students who grow up in
single mother households have more egalitarian gender role attitudes than those who grow up
in households with both parents in the household or who are raised by a single father. Students
who are immersed in an environment of traditional family – as measured by whether the grand-
parents are at home – are less gender egalitarian even when exposed to women’s protests as are
students who are members in a religious organization. Among the country-level variables, GDP
per capita and democracy are signed in the expected direction with democratic countries and
those with higher GDP per capita having higher levels of egalitarian gender attitudes. The coeffi-
cient for post-communist regimes is significant and negative, indicating, ceteris paribus, adoles-
cents in these countries are less egalitarian in their gender role attitudes than individuals in
other countries.
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